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Abstract 
 We examine the cyclical behaviour of European bank capital buffers using an 
unbalanced panel data set comprising eight years (1997-2004) of bank balance sheet 
data for commercial, savings and co-operative banks. Controlling for other potential 
determinants of bank capital, we find that capital buffers of the banks in the acces-
sion countries (RAM10) have a significant positive relationship with the cycle, 
while for banks operative in the EU15 and the EA and the combined EU25 the rela-
tionship is significantly negative. We also find fairly slow speeds of adjustment, 
with around two-thirds of the correction towards desired capital buffers taking place 
each year. We further distinguish by type and size of bank, finding that capital buff-
ers of commercial and savings banks, and also of a sub-sample of large banks, ex-
hibit negative co-movement. Co-operative banks and smaller banks on the other 
hand, tend to exhibit positive cyclical co-movement. 
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1. Introduction 
Much debate surrounding the new Accord (Basel II) on bank capital requirements, 
due to come into force in 2007, has centred on its potential ‘pro-cyclicality’. One of 
the primary aims of Basel II is to create a closer link between capital requirements 
and risks, so it is clear that these requirements will become more dependent on the 
business cycle. In a cyclical downturn, when counterparties are more likely to be 
downgraded than upgraded, the resultant effect could be a significant increase in the 
capital requirements to account for increased counterparty risk. Similarly, during an 
economic upturn, the amount of capital required would be reduced. Since raising 
capital is costly, especially during an economic recession when profits are decreas-
ing, banks might be forced to reduce their loan portfolio in a recession, so as to meet 
rising capital requirements. Thus many have argued that the new Accord will make 
it much harder for policy makers to maintain macroeconomic stability.  
 The growing literature on the potential pro-cyclicality of Basel II has largely fo-
cussed on quantifying the likely range of variation in ‘Pillar 1’ capital requirements 
through the business cycle.1 In practice, well-functioning banks hold capital well in 
excess of the minimum requirements, which will reduce the impact of Pillar 1 regu-
latory capital requirements on loan portfolios. Moreover, the supervisory review 
powers granted to regulators under Pillar 2, allowing them to demand a buffer of ad-
ditional capital during a business cycle expansion, provide policy makers with a tool 
to counter the potential pro-cyclicality effect of the new accord. Al this implies that 
the management of bank capital buffers over the course of the business cycle will be 
as or even more important than the ‘Pillar 1’ requirements as a determinant of the 
cyclical impact of the new capital regulations.  
 With this policy concern in mind, we investigate the behaviour of bank capital 
buffers of European banks, under the old Basel 1988 accord on capital regulation. 
By ‘capital buffer’ we mean the amount of capital banks hold in excess of that re-
quired of them by national regulators. The main objective of our paper is to establish 
the extent of co-movement between this buffer and the cycle, and to determine 
whether such co-movement is country, bank type or bank size specific. We also ana-
lyse the impact of various cost and revenue variables on the behaviour of bank capi-
tal buffers.  
 Our estimation results reveal substantial differences in the cyclical behaviour of 
capital buffers between the various sub-groups. We find that capital buffers of RAM 
(10 countries that joined the EU in May 2004) banks appear to move together with 
                                               
1 Basel II is based on three complementary pillars. Pillar 1 consists of the regulatory calculations of 
capital requirements for market, credit, and operational risk. Pillar 2 is the supervisory review pro-
cess, where supervisors assess both the bank’s total capital adequacy for the full range of risks includ-
ing those not covered by Pillar 1 and the bank’s management of capital. Pillar 3 is market discipline. 
In order to improve transparency of banks to counterparties and investors, banks will be required to 
disclose detailed information on their risk profile and capital adequacy. 
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the business cycle while the buffers of banks operative in the EU25, EU15, Den-
mark, Sweden and the United Kingdom (DK,SE,UK) and EA samples rather exhibit 
negative co-movement. The latter finding is broadly in line with most of the individ-
ual country studies that analyse the determinants of excess capital and their relation-
ship to the cycle (see among others Ediz et al., 1998; Rime, 2001; Ayuso et al., 
2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004; Lindqvist, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005).  
 Breaking the sample down further by size and type of bank, we find additional 
distinctions. Capital buffers of commercial and savings banks, as well as those of 
larger banks have a negative relationship with the cycle while those of co-operative 
banks and of smaller banks move together with the cycle. With regard to the associ-
ated costs, in almost all cases we find a fairly slow speed of adjustment towards de-
sired capital buffers. These results provide a benchmark from which inferences relat-
ing to the introduction of Basel II and its effect on capital buffer management can be 
made. In particular, they shed some light on how capital management decisiosn may 
need to be adjusted through Pillar II and III of Basel II in order to offset the potential 
cyclical effects of the new accord. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation for hold-
ing excess capital, sets out the hypotheses we test, and describes our data including 
the various controls we introduce for the non-cyclical determinants of bank capital. 
We can only test hypotheses about the reduced form cyclical behaviour of capital 
buffers. Section 3 presents our specification and empirical results together with 
some robustness checks. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
  
2. Hypotheses and Data Description 
Our data, for the years 1997-2004, reported in Table 1, indicates that banks hold far 
more prudential capital than that required by the regulators.2 Tier 1 capital buffers of 
banks within the EU15 vary from 1.87 percent of risk-weighted assets in Portugal to 
4.79 percent in Finland with an average across the EU15 of 2.93 percent. Buffers are 
also substantial in the accession countries, ranging between 2.64 percent in Cyprus 
and 6.99 in Malta. The average buffer for the RAM10 is around 5.14 percent which 
is considerably larger than in the EU15. 
 Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks hold excess capital 
(see amongst other studies Marcus, 1984; Berger et al., 1995; Jackson et. al., 1999; 
Milne and Whalley, 2001; Estrella, 2004; Milne, 2004). Banks generally will tend to 
assess their risks differently than regulators, for instance using their own internal 
economic capital models. Appropriate bank-specific capital levels will therefore be 
set according to their own assumptions and risk appetites. Banks may also need to 
hold excess capital in order to signal soundness to the market and satisfy the expec-
                                               
2 Similarly large capital buffers are also held by US and Asian banks. See for example Peura and Jok-
ivuolle (2004) for a tabulation of US capital buffers. 
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tations of rating agencies (Jackson et. al., 1999). These ‘market disciplines’ may 
lead banks to holding more capital required by regulators. 
 Banks may also hold a buffer of capital as a protection against the violation of 
the regulatory minimum requirements (Marcus, 1984; Milne and Whalley, 2001; 
Milne, 2004). By holding capital as a buffer, banks insure themselves against costs 
arising from a supervisory intervention in response to a violation of the require-
ments.  
 A further reason for holding a capital buffer is to take advantage of future 
'growth opportunities', putting banks in a position to obtain wholesale funds quickly 
and at a competitive rate of interest in the event of unexpected profitable investment 
opportunities. In the event of a substantial increase in loan demand, banks with rela-
tively little capital may lose market share to those that are well capitalised. 
 It is difficult to empirically distinguish these different underlying determinants 
of bank capital buffers: for example higher portfolio volatility can be expected to 
increase capital buffers, whether these are the result of market disciplines or of a de-
sire to avoid supervisory interventions. Our paper has a more limited objective, to 
investigate how capital buffers of European banks behave over the business cycle, 
and in particular whether capital buffers are higher in business upturns and lower in 
business downturns (positive co-movement) or the reverse (negative co-movement), 
controlling as far as we can for various bank specific determinants of capital buff-
ers..  
 We thus test the following null hypothesis: 0H  Under the Basel I Accord, 
business cycle fluctuations do not have an impact on the capital buffers of Euro-
pean banks; against two alternatives: )(1 aH  Capital buffers co-move positively with 
the business cycle i.e. banks tend to increase capital in business cycle expansions 
and reduce capital in recessions; and )(1 bH  Capital buffers co-move negatively 
with the business cycle i.e. banks tend to reduce capital in business cycle expan-
sions and increase capital in recessions.  
 These descriptive hypotheses are consistent with a number of different underly-
ing structural models of bank capital dynamics. Estrella (2004) examines the rela-
tionship between optimal forward looking capital buffers and deterministic cycles of 
loan losses. He finds that banks, subject to costs of capital adjustment, will build up 
capital buffers in anticipation of loan losses. Since loan losses themselves tend to lag 
the business cycle, this suggests that actual capital buffers will rise during cyclical 
downturns, i.e. negative cyclical co-movement. 
 It is also argued (see amongst others Rajan, 1994; Borio et al., 2001; Crockett, 
2001) that portfolio risks actually increase during an economic upturn. During an 
economic boom, lenders provide large amounts of credit while imbalances that will 
become responsible for the following recession continue to build up, increasing the 
possibility of unusually large losses during a cyclical downturn. Under this interpre-
tation rational forward looking banks may build up capital buffers during cyclical 
upturns, i.e. positive co-movement.  
 4 
 Both positive and negative co-movement may also arise as a consequence of 
myopic bank behaviour. For example during an economic upturn, when risks are 
less likely to immediately materialise,  banks may underestimate risks and as a result 
expand their loan portfolios and lower their capital ratios (negative co-movement). 
On the other hand unanticipatedly high levels of loan-loss provisions in an extended 
cyclical downturn may lead to lower capital ratios in a deep recession (positive co-
movement) 
 While we cannot distinguish these different structural models of bank capital 
buffers, or distinguish myopic from forward looking expectations, we can control for 
institution specific factors that influence the banks desired level of capital. A large 
body of literature examines variations in risk profile and portfolio and capital struc-
ture decisions between different types of banks (see among others, Saunders et al., 
1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Esty, 1997; Salas and Saurina, 2002b). Differences 
in capital buffers can arise because of variations, in portfolio risks, in ownership 
structures and in access to the capital market.  
 The clearest prediction of this literature is that larger banks will hold smaller 
average capital buffers. Most obviously, large geographically diversified banks will 
have a much smaller probability of experiencing a large decline in their capital rati-
os, a diversification effect increasing with size. This effect is reinforced by asym-
metric information between lenders and borrowers and by government support for 
banks that are ‘too big to fail’. Banks help overcome information asymmetries by 
screening and monitoring borrowers, but these are costly activities and banks are 
likely balance the cost of (and gain from) these activities against the cost of excess 
capital. In the presence of scale economies in screening and monitoring, one would 
expect large banks to substitute relatively less of these activities with excess capital. 
Large banks may expect a greater degree of support than small banks from the gov-
ernment in the event of difficulties, further reducing capital buffers.  
 
Sample selection 
We build an unbalanced panel data set with eight years of annual bank balance sheet 
data obtained from the Bureau Van Dyck Bankscope database. Our sample includes 
data for commercial, savings and co-operative banks. In total, 468 banks are includ-
ed in the sample, made up of 364 EA banks, 427 EU15 banks and 41 banks for the 
RAM10 (the 10 accession countries that joined the European Union in 2005). All 25 
European Union countries are represented in the sample. As is usual in panel studies 
using accounting data, we remove some extreme outlier observations of changes in 
capital buffers.3 
                                               
3 Of the total [] observations available to us , we dropped [] in the extreme tails of the cross sectional 
distribution of capital buffers, at a much larger number of standard deviations from the mean than the 
bulk of observations. Of these dropped oservations [] were declines in capital buffers below –[] and 
the remaining [] were increases above []. 
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 The largest bank in the samples is BNP Paribas, with total assets of around EUR 
906 bln at the end of 2004. The smallest bank, Budapest Bank in Hungary, has total 
assets amounting to just around EUR 1.5 million at the end of 2004. The distribution 
of banks in the sample is presented in Table 3, with the largest number of banks in 
France (103 banks) and Spain (70 banks) from the EU15 and in Poland (10 banks) 
for the RAM10.  
 Our sample is further broken down by bank type distinguishing between com-
mercial, co-operative and savings banks. We additionally differentiate between 
'small' and 'large' banks, defining large banks as those with total assets exceeding the 
2004 median of EUR 37 billion in 2004. The sample distribution across countries, 
by type and size of bank, is presented in Table 3. The RAM10 sub-sample is made 
up of small commercial banks, with the exception of a small Polish savings bank, 
Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank. We divide the EU15 into two further sub-
samles, the Euro area (EA) and Denmark, Sweden, and UK (DKSEUK). The two 
sub-samples and the total EU15 contain a similar breakdown of banks, with 19 per-
cent of banks large and with 65 percent commercial banks, 15 percent co-operative 
banks and around 20 percent savings banks. Acrorss the entire data set Sweden has 
the largest percentage of 'large' banks (around 50 percent), followed by Ireland 
(around 35 percent).  
Dependent and explanatory variables 
Table 1 tabulates average capital buffers in our sample, by time and by country. 
Here the capital buffer is measured as the institutions’ total Tier 1 plust Tier 2 capi-
tal Basel 1 risk-weighted capital ratio less its regulatory minimum requirements. 
These requirements vary slightly from one country to another, as summarised in Ta-
ble 2, sometimes exceeding the Basel minimum of 8%. The individual country aver-
ages are obtained by weighting the buffer by the market share (total assets) of the 
individual banks. There are several differences in the buffer sizes between countries. 
Many of the smaller countries such as Finland, Belgium and Ireland have large buff-
ers of around 4 percent when compared to banks in larger countries such as France 
and Italy and the UK, where the buffers are around two percent above the required 
minimum.  
 On average over our sample period RAM10 banks held far more capital than 
banks in the EU15 countries (see the un-weighted averages of the composite coun-
tries at the bottom of Table 1.). However this gap has declined over time. Figure 1 
plots the evolution of our individual sub-sample capital buffers. In the EU15 capital 
buffers rose slightly between 1998 and 1999, but then increased substantially be-
tween 2002 and 2003. In the RAM10 countries capital buffers have behaved very 
differently, rising steadily from 1997 to 1998 before falling sharply between 2000 
and 2001. Thereafter, the RAM10 buffer level continues on a slight downward trend 
and by 2004 is at a similar level to the EU15.  
 In Figure 2, we plot the evolution of capital buffers over time, distinguish be-
tween different bank types and bank sizes, for our four sub-samples, and compares 
these buffers with our principal explanatory variable, the output gap. The capital 
 6 
buffers of co-operative banks behave very differently than those of commercial and 
savings banks. This is unsurprising considering large differences in ownership struc-
ture and objectives of co-operative banks. Moreover, the difficulty that co-operative 
banks face in increasing their capital base to match growth in business opportunities 
when compared to commercial and savings banks, can additionally affect the behav-
iour of their buffers over time.4 This figure also confirms that small banks hold 
much higher average capital buffers than large banks.  
 Table 4 provides definitions of the remaining variables used in our estimation. 
Our cyclical indicator is real GDP growth caclauted from Eurostat data for each of 
the 25 countries and for the different sub-sample country groupings.5 6 
 We have to consider carefully the timing of Since balance sheet data reported in 
2004 will most likely reflect economic conditions in 2003, we take the first lag of 
each cycle variable. By using first lags, rather than the cycle variables in levels, we 
are able to attain a more accurate picture of the actual relationship that exists be-
tween the cycle and the buffer variable. In this paper we present results separately 
for the broad and the individual country real GDP growth variables only.  
 Our basic specification (model specification 1) controls for individual bank ex-
pected revenues, the cost of failure and the cost of capital adjustment. These cost 
variables can be interpreted as proxies for the determinants of capital buffers in the 
theoretical model provided by Estrella (2004). The first of these determinants is the 
greater cost of equity capital funding, relative to deposits or debt. Theoretical analy-
sis (see Myers and Majluf, 1984; Campbell, 1979) suggests that in the context of in-
formation asymmetries, equity is a more costly alternative to other bank liabilities. 
Equity may also be relatively disadvantaged because interest payments on debt are 
deducted from earnings before tax.  
 Direct measurement of this cost is difficult. Previous studies have included the 
banks return on equity )(ROE , the ratio of post-tax earnings to book equity,as a 
proxy for the direct costs of remunerating excess capital. However ROE is the ratio 
of post-tax earnings to equity capital. In the short run (when equity capital is exoge-
nous) ROE is a measure of revenues rather than of costs. For comparability with 
previous studies we include ROE as a controlling variable, but we acknowledge that 
this reflects both revenue and cost effects. However the shortThe buffer capital 
model of Milne (2004) suggests that for financially strong banks this revenue impact 
will generate a negative relationship beween ROE and capital buffers, because a 
high level of earnings substitutes for capital as a buffer against unexpected shocks. 
                                               
4 Co-operative banks cannot issue new shares and members prefer cash payments over retained earn-
ings because there is no market for their ownership claims. 
5 A negative output gap in a country with 10 percent trend growth may not be expected to cause a 
recession-deepening restriction on bank portfolios. 
6 We also investigated the use of the output gap which we obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter to the real GDP series. Estimates substituting this gap differed to only a minor extent and are 
therefore not presented here. 
Comment [a1]: Terhi, please add refer-
ences 
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We therefore expect to observe a negative relationship between the capital buffer 
and the ROE variable. 
 The second cost is the cost of failure. Regulators constantly monitor banks' capi-
tal ratios C , ensuring that they do not fall below the regulatory minimum *C  thus 
reducing the probability of bankruptcy and the costs associated with failure.7 Here, 
when *CC =  the bank is faced with the option of recapitalizing or liquidating. 
Higher levels of capital therefore reduce the risk of non-compliance and the subse-
quent costs of failure which are directly proportional to absolute value of the nega-
tive net worth of the failing bank (Milne and Whalley, 2001).  
 The actual cost of failure can be considered as the loss of share value times the 
probability of failure. Since a banks' probability of failure is dependent on its risk 
profile, we proxy the cost of failure by adopting various measures of risk. As a first 
measure, we consider the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans )(RISK  as in 
Ayuso et. al (2002). This is an ex post measure of the risks assumed by banks and is 
comparable to other measures adopted in the literature since banks with non-
performing loans are obliged to make provisions for loan losses. We further include 
an alternative measure for risk as per Stoltz and Wedow (2005) and Lindquist (2004) 
whereby we consider the ratio of new net provisions over total assets )2(RISK .8 If 
banks set their capital in line with the true riskiness of their portfolios, then we 
would expect the relationship here to be positive.9  
 As discussed above there are several reasons, most notably greater portfolio di-
versification, for expecting a negative relationship between bank size and the level 
of capital buffers. We include a SIZE variable, the natural log of total assets, as a 
further measure of the cost of failure. 
 The final costs are the costs of capital adjustment. Considering financing under 
asymmetric information, costs in this sense are incurred when banks are forced to 
make use of external funds to add to existing internal capital (see for example Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Such a cost mechanism provides motivation for holding higher 
levels of capital as a way of mitigating costs of remuneration. If the bank lets its in-
ternal funds fall too far, it is faced with the choice between cutting highly rewarding 
investments or incurring high costs of external finance. In order to capture these ad-
justment costs, we include the lagged dependent variable 1−tBUF . We follow Estrella 
(2004) by assuming the costs of adjusting capital are quadratic. With this specifica-
tion higher adjustment costs would result in a higher coefficient of the lagged de-
                                               
7 So called losses of failure include the loss of charter value, reputational loss, and the legal costs of 
the bankruptcy process. (see Ancharya, 1996). 
8 As the results for RISK are broadly in line with those obtained for 2RISK , we present only those 
for 2RISK for which a greater number of observations are available.  
9 Banks may vary significantly in their willingness to take risk. This measure therefore can be as-
sumed to uncover information on bank type. Any further idiosyncratic time-invariant component in 
the banks risk profile would be captured by the iµ component of the residual term of Equation 2. 
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pendent variable, signifying a slower speed of adjustment. We expect the coefficient 
to be positively signed. 
 In a further specification (model specification 2) we include some additional 
balance sheet variables, to further control for the determinants of bank capital. The 
size of a banks' profit can have an effect on bank capital in either a positive or a neg-
ative fashion but are considered an important source of capital financing, affecting 
the cost of adjustment. Since retained earnings are usually employed as a means to 
increase the capital cushion, a positive relationship would be evident. High profits 
on the other hand can similarly reflect high contract values and hence the need to 
consistently generate high profits. Consequently, capital buffers are increased 
through retained earnings implying a negative relationship between the buffer and 
the generation of profits (see Whalley and Milne, 2001). We therefore include post 
tax profits over total assets a measure of PROFIT with an ambiguous anticipated 
sign.  
 Finally, we further include the level of bank loans NET( )LOANS  which acts to 
further reflect the risk profile of the bank since banks themselves could vary their 
capital buffers according to the risk profile of their loan portfolio. A larger number 
of loans with respect to total assets are likelier to reflect a riskier profile; the ex-
pected sign is therefore positive. We additionally incorporate annual loan growth 
)( LOAN∆ as a proxy for credit demand (Ayuso et al., 2004). Despite this variable 
being the interaction between credit supply and demand, it nevertheless serves as a 
proxy for credit demand since the main potential credit supply constraint (the capital 
requirements) is not binding in our sample. i.e. capital buffers are always positive. 
Moreover, since an increase in loan supply implies an increase in capital require-
ments, which in a context whereby the adjustment of capital )( 1−tBUF  is costly, is 
likely to result in an increase in capital buffers. 
   
3. Specification and Estimation Results 
Following previous literature (including Ayuso et al., 2004; Estrella, 2004), we test 
the hypotheses detailed in Section 2 through the use of a partial adjustment frame-
work, where banks adjust capital towards a desired optimum capital buffers.  The 
specification takes the following form: 
 
ijtijtijtijt uBUFBUFBUF +−=∆ − )( 1
*δ  (1a) 
 Here i = 1,2… N  is an index of countries j = 1,2…. iJ   and index of banks 
within each country and t = 1,2,…, 
ij
T  is the index of time observation for bank j  
in country i .  ijtu  is the error term that can be decomposed as the sum of two compo-
nents, a random country specific component iµ , plus a pure bank idiosyncratic 
component ijtε . 
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 ijtBUF ( 
*
ijtBUF ) is equal to the (optimum) capital buffer of bank i  in country 
j at time t .  The proportionate adjustment towards the desired capital buffer in each 
period here is captured by δ . If 1=δ , then adjustment is instantaneous while if 
0=δ then there is no adjustment.  
        *ijtBUF  however cannot be observed, and is therefore approximated by the various 
cost and revenue variables discussed in the previous section.10 The empirical model to be 
tested therefore becomes: 
 
( ) ijttijtijtijtijt uCYCLEBUFKFKKBUF ++−++= − βδγα 11  (1b) 
 
 Here itKK , itKF  and denote the cost of holding capital and the cost of failure as 
discussed in Section 2. The reported coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
are estimates of δ−1  i.e. the closer the estimated coefficient on the lagged depend-
ent variable is to 0 the faster the speed of adjustment 
 Since we estimate dynamic models, including the lagged endogenous variable, 
we employ the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure of Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) estimator. The methodology assumes no autocorrelation in the 
ijtu  and uses the entire set of lagged itBUF  as instruments. We also include two to 
four lags of our other principal explanatory variables ( RISK and ROE ) as instru-
ments in order to avoid correlation with ijtu . The number of instruments chosen in 
each model was the largest possible, for which the Sargan J-statistic for over-
identification restrictions was still satisfied. We additionally apply the Newey-West 
correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariances to fur-
ther adjust the t-values for additional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
  
Estimation results for country groups. 
We estimate two variations of our model. The results are presented in Table 5 for the 
total EU25 sample and our five sub-sample country groups. Our first model (labelled 
model specification 1) employs ROE , RISK , and SIZE , as controls for the costs of 
capital management. Estimation results are presented with both the domestic and the 
broad cycle (EU25) measures of the output gap.  
 For the case of the EU25, EU15, EA and DK,SE,UK samples, we find a nega-
tive significant relationship between the capital buffer and each of  the output gap 
variables. These findings support our )(1 aH hypothesis of negative cyclical co-
movements in capital. The largest effect is seen for the DK,SE,UK sample, where 
the capital buffer decreases on average around 0.45 percentage points on a one per-
centage point rise in the domestic cyclical variable. 
                                               
10 For a theoretical derivation and explanation of linear-quadratic partial adjustment in models of 
bank capital see Ayuso et al. 2004 or Estrella, 2004. 
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 These findings are broadly in line with previous literature. Ayuso et al. (2004) 
Lindqvist (2004) and Stoltz and Wedow (2005) find a similar negative relationship 
between bank buffers and the cycle variables for German, Spanish and Norwegian 
banks respectively. These findings can additionally be compared to those of Bikker 
and Metzemakers who conduct a cross-country analysis of bank capital buffers for 
29 OECD countries. Their OECD sample can in some respects be considered to be 
similar to our EU25 sample in that it includes both RAM10 and original member 
state countries. While they do uncover a negative relationship, they find that cyclical 
effects are fairly limited. 
 The RAM10 sample returns opposite results. Here we find a significant positive 
relationship between the buffer and the cycle variables. This finding is in line with 
our )(1 bH hypothesis of pro-cyclicality and would tend to suggest forward-looking 
or prudent bank behaviour. Here we see a significant decrease in the capital buffer 
variable of 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points for a one percentage point rise in the 
domestic and the broad output gap respectively.  
 The coefficient on ROE , our proxy for the cost of capital, returns a significant 
negative coefficient, as expected, in each of the sub-sample estimations. The coeffi-
cients are essentially uniform across sub-groups, suggesting that the direct effects of 
such costs on bank capital are similar between European countries. 
 2RISK  (loan loss provisions over total lending) is highly significant and posi-
tive for four of the five sub-samples. This suggests that banks with relatively risky 
portfolios generally do hold more capital For the case of DK,SE,UK, the 2RISK co-
efficients are negative and significant. This counterintuitive finding is in line with 
some of the other literature in this field (Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindqvist, 2005). 
 The SIZE coefficients are consistently and significantly negative. This finding is 
as expected and consistent with several explanations of buffer capital. Larger banks 
may hold less capital because they anticipate state support (the 'too big to fail hy-
pothesis'). This finding is also consistent with the presence of scale economies in 
screening and monitoring, i.e. larger banks are more transparent, can access capital 
markets with less cost, and therefore require less excess capital held as insurance 
against risk. Finally, the negative SIZE  coefficient is consistent with the notion that 
smaller banks are less diversified than their larger counterparts and therefore hold 
higher levels of buffer capital. The SIZE coefficients are generally uniform across 
sub-groups with slightly larger coefficients for the RAM10 countries. 
 Finally, the cost of adjusting capital, captured by the lagged endogenous varia-
ble, is positive and significant in almost all cases. This finding is in line with the 
view that the costs of capital adjustment are an important explanation of the holding 
of large capital buffers. The coefficients are largely uniform across sub-samples, 
which would indicate that the costs of adjustment are largely consistent between 
countries, corresponding to a rate of adjustment towards desired capital of around 66 
percent per annum. However we find that the coefficients are negative for the DK, 
SE, UK sub-sample, which is inconsistent with a costly adjustment model of bank 
capital management. 
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 Table 5 presents further estimation results for a second model (model specifica-
tion 2), adding several further balance sheet variables to our baseline model (model 
specification 1). Our principal finding here is that the inclusion of these additional 
variables, leaves the relationship between the output gap and bank capital buffers 
largely unchanged. Both the domestic and the broad output gap remain negatively 
related to the buffer variable in the EU25, EU15, EA and DK,SE,UK sub-samples. 
The effect continues to be largest for the DK,SE,UK sub-sample predicting that a 
one percentage point fall in either the domestic or the broad output gap would result 
in a 0.77 and 0.61 percentage points fall in desired capital. Similarly for the RAM10 
banks, the relationship between the capital buffer and the cycle remains positive and 
significant. These findings confirm the robustness of the results obtained via the es-
timation of the baseline model above.  
 The coefficient on the proxy for the cost of holding capital ( ROE ) and the speed 
of adjustment (the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable) are also broadly un-
changed from those reported for model specification 1. The coefficients for 
the RISK proxies are now larger while the coefficient on the SIZE variable is smaller 
and no longer significant. For the DK,SE,UK and RAM10 sub-samples the coeffi-
cient has become positive and significant. 
 The new PROFIT variable for all sub-samples is positive and highly significant; 
indicating that retained earnings seem to be used to increase the capital cushion. The 
effect is noticeably larger for the EA sample when compared to the other sub-
samples. The expected negative sign for the NET LOANS  variable is found for the 
EU15, EA and RAM10 sub-samples, however the coefficients are broadly insignifi-
cant. The DK,SE,UK sample returns a highly significant positive coefficient. Con-
sidering the LOAN∆ variable, for all sub-samples, we find the parameter to be high-
ly significant, with a negative sign as expected. This finding suggests that a contem-
poraneous increase in loan demand substantially reduces the capital buffer. 
 We have estimated a variety of other specifications, including subsets of the ex-
planatory variables reported in Table 5. In all cases the relationship between the cap-
ital buffer and the output gap is very similar to that which we report here, and hence 
these results are not reported. 
 
Estimation results for sub-groups of types and sizes of banks. 
Table 6 reports further versions of these estimation results, for sub-groups of banks, 
distinguishing commercial, savings and co-operative banks and also large and small 
banks. We report estimates only for the EA15. This is because the RAM10 sub-
sample consists only of small commercial banks and RAM10 banks appear to be-
have so differently from those in the EA15. Considering commercial and savings 
banks, we find that for savings banks the co-movement with the cycle remains nega-
tive, but for co-operative banks the relationship is very different with a positive rela-
tionship evident between the cycle and capital buffers. The results for savings banks 
are more significant than for commercial banks, suggesting that the negative rela-
tionship reported in Table 5 is largely driven by savings banks.  
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 This finding can help explain the relationship between our results and those of 
other researchers. Stoltz and Wedow (2005) present evidence for German banks 
showing that the relationship between the buffer and the cycle variable is stronger 
for savings banks than it is for co-operatives. The cross-country study of Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2004) finds that the cyclical effects appear to be limited. This finding 
is in line with our results since they focus their estimations on commercial banks on-
ly. Ayuso et al. (2004) consider only savings and commercial banks in their study 
and find a robustly significant negative relationship. Their study does not however 
analyse bank type effects separately. 
 The ROE variable coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 5. The 
coefficient is noticeably more significant amongst savings banks than it is for co-
operative or commercial banks. This finding tends to indicate that the cost of hold-
ing excess capital appears to be most significant for co-operative banks when com-
pared to savings and commercial banks.  
 The RISK coefficient remains positive and significant for both commercial and 
co-operative banks in all three sub-samples, while it is negative for savings banks. 
The sizes of the coefficients are notably larger for co-operative banks. The 
SIZE variables are negative and significant for co-operative banks while they are 
largely insignificant for the other bank types.  
 For all three sub-samples, the 1−tBUF  variable is positive and highly significant 
for commercial banks, while it is very small (and significant) for savings banks and 
insignificant for co-operative banks. This suggests that adjustment costs are most 
important for commercial banks. 
 Turning to the comparison by bank size, also reported in Table 6, a positive and 
significant relationship appears to exist between the capital buffers of small banks 
and output gap variables, while the relationship is negative and significant for large 
banks. The coefficients on the ROE  variable are little changed from those obtained 
for the initial total sample estimations. The coefficients are negative and highly sig-
nificant for both small and large banks.  
 The RISK coefficients remain positive and significant for both small and large 
banks, while the coefficients vary for the SIZE variables. For small banks we find 
positive and significant coefficients, while the coefficients for large banks are nega-
tive and significant. Taken together these results suggest a hump shaped relationship 
with the largest capital buffers found amongst middle sized banks. This is in line 
with the hypothesis that the very largest banks generally feel themselves protected 
by the government safety net as per the 'too-big-to-fail' hypothesis. These results 
warrant further investigation. 
 The estimated cost of adjusting capital (the coefficient on 1−tBUF ) is significant 
for both large and small banks. The coefficient is somewhat lower for small banks 
suggesting that adjustment costs play a larger role in the case of large banks.  
 To summarise, our estimations by both size and type of bank provide evidence 
that the capital buffers of both small and co-operative banks tend to have a positive 
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relationship with the output gap variables. On the other hand we find negative co-
movement with the cycle for commercial banks, savings banks, and large banks. 
These differential results might be due to different access to capital markets or due 
to the fact both smaller banks as well as cooperative banks are more reliant on re-
tained earnings than other banks in the sample hence building up capital during the 
economic upturn.  
 
Robustness tests. 
In order to complete our analysis, we conducted several further alternative estima-
tions as a check on the robustness of our main findings. Since they do not alter the 
reported relationship between buffer capital and the business cycle, these estimation 
results are not reported here, but are available from the authors. 
Our model incorporates several jointly determined variables. The issue then arises 
whether the reduced form relationships that we have reported beween capital buffers 
and the business cycle are robust to alternative dynamic specifications. To investi-
gate this we have also estimated  a static version of the model where we omit the 
lagged dependent variable 1−tBUF . We also experimented with varying lag lengths 
for the explanatory variables, and by dropping of the ROE  variable from the estima-
tions altogether. In all cases the coefficients on teh business cycle variables remain 
very close to our reported results, indicating that these estimates are reasonably ro-
bust to dynamic respecification. 
There are potentially individual national effects that could arise from various coun-
try-specific characteristics relating to the legal, regulatory, structural, or tax and ac-
counting framework. A simple way to test, and control for these conditions, is to 
create a country-specific dummy variable )( iD for each country. As it turns out, 
there are no significant fixed country dummy variables in our regressions, indicating 
that all the national effects are already captured by our chosen specifications.  
 
We re-estimated our model, including both the broad and the domestic cycle com-
ponents among the regressors. The idea here is that the domestic cycle could capture 
dynamic national effects that are not depicted by the broad EU25 cycle. We would 
expect this effect to be particularly relevant for those countries outside EMU that, in 
principle, are more likely to have a business cycle dynamics different from the core 
EMU countries11.We find that for both the DK,SE, UK and the RAM10 samples, we 
are able to detect significant additional effects from the domestic cycle variable, in-
dicating that national effects beyond those captured by the individual country dum-
mies exists. In the case of the DK,SE,UK and the RAM10 country grouping, we find 
that both the EU25 and the domestic cycle are significant at the five percent level. 
                                               
11 We start by calculating correlations between both the individual cycle and the sub-group cycle in 
order to investigate whether multicollinearity affects our estimations. As all coefficients are signifi-
cantly below one, we can proceed without further work. For brevity, correlations between variables 
are not presented here but are available from the authors on request. 
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This suggests that national effects, as captured by the individual country business 
cycle variables, are important for the countries making up the DK, SE, UK and 
RAM10 sub-samples. These effects appear to have a significant impact on the 
movements and fluctuations of capital buffers of these countries12.  
Finally we have been concerned with a further econometric problem affecting all 
studies, such as our own, that combine macro-level and micro-data, whether in panel 
or cross-section. This problem, originally highlighted by Moulton (1990), is the pos-
sibility of a substantial downward bias on standard errors for macro-economic varia-
bles, when there is clustering of unobserved random variables. This possibility can-
not be ignored since any omission of macro-economic variables, affecting the de-
pendent variable, will lead to such clustering.  
 
 4. Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship that exists between European bank capital 
buffer fluctuations and business cycle variations over the last eight years. Much of 
the empirical literature in this field has focussed on examining the determinants of 
bank capitalization within a single country. Our research is cross-country and cen-
tred on the comparison of different sub-sample groups of countries.  
 We build an unbalanced panel of 486 banks, using annual balance sheet data be-
tween 1997 and 2004. Controlling for various probable determinants of capital buff-
er movements, we analyse the remaining impact that the cycle variables appear to 
have. We find that for the EU25, EU15, EA and DK,SE,UK sub-samples, a signifi-
cant negative relationship between the capital buffers of banks and the output gap 
exists. This finding is in line with the existing literature in this field and provides 
further cause for concern relating to the potential 'pro-cyclical' impact that the intro-
duction of the new Accord will have on the amplification of the business cycle. For 
the RAM10 banks i.e. those in the 10 accession countries that joined the EU in 2004, 
our results indicate that capital buffers co-move positively with the output gap. The 
results suggest that the introduction of Basel II might have a stronger impact on cap-
ital management in the EU15 countries than in the RAM10. 
 We further break the sample down, distinguishing between both type and size of 
bank. Our findings indicate that capital buffers of large banks, and of commercial 
and savings banks, appear to behave in a similar fashion to the sample as a whole, 
co-moving negatively with the output gap i.e. declining in recession.  On the other 
hand the capital buffers of small banks and of co-operative banks co-move positive-
ly with the cycle, rising in recession. These differential results might be due to dif-
ferent access to capital markets or due to the fact that these banks are more reliant on 
                                               
12 We additionally experiment by substituting the broad cycle with the difference between the domes-
tic cycle and the broad cycle. The results are largely unchanged with those obtained using the domes-
tic and the broad cycle together. 
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retained earnings than other banks in the sample hence building up capital during the 
economic upturn.  
 While these results are striking, they are limited by the restricted data available. 
Furthermore, as indicated by Figure 2, it is apparent that much of the buffer move-
ments of the RAM10 banks have occurred during the first half of the sample period. 
Therefore, when more data on these countries becomes available, further research 
into the degree to which capital buffer decisions of RAM10 are converging to be-
come more like the other EU members would be beneficial.  
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    Table 1: Total Capital Buffers by Country (weighted by total assets) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  avg 
AT 0.72 2.09 2.09 1.96 2.89 2.63 3.08 3.10  2.32 
BE 3.43 3.45 4.37 5.75 5.31 5.06 4.66 4.45  4.56 
FI 4.03 2.49 4.01 1.38 1.68 2.53 10.97 11.20  4.79 
FR 2.24 2.31 2.13 1.80 1.78 1.67 1.84 1.49  1.91 
DE 1.96 1.89 2.46 3.00 2.79 2.85 4.41 4.37  2.97 
GR 1.73 1.67 6.21 4.51 2.83 2.24 3.42 4.57  3.40 
IE 3.02 3.54 3.23 3.05 3.05 4.95 6.82 5.54  4.15 
IT 1.49 1.81 1.46 1.61 1.34 2.32 2.42 2.87  1.92 
LU 4.87 4.07 4.26 4.07 3.94 3.75 4.88 2.47  4.04 
NL 2.96 2.84 2.71 2.69 2.80 3.23 3.56 3.50  3.04 
PT 2.66 1.86 2.35 0.98 1.23 1.62 2.04 2.21  1.87 
ES 1.93 2.75 2.39 2.50 3.20 2.82 2.63 2.51  2.59 
 
DK 2.29 2.22 2.62 1.75 2.24 2.43 2.79 2.23  2.32 
SE 2.55 2.73 3.23 2.46 2.70 2.29 2.53 2.68  2.65 
UK 1.70 1.47 1.89 2.37 1.50 0.96 0.92 0.85  1.46 
 
CY 2.13 1.34 3.94 4.63 3.24 1.52 1.48 2.83  2.64 
CZ 2.09 3.79 4.81 6.13 4.03 3.94 4.43 2.74  4.00 
EE 3.23 8.57 10.55 7.53 6.84 6.55 5.18 4.01  6.56 
HU 4.51 4.73 7.32 6.88 3.27 4.68 2.27 1.96  4.45 
LAT 8.10 1.60 4.78 3.00 2.74 2.42 2.33 4.14  3.64 
LIT 2.23 15.40 3.12 3.79 4.49 4.81 1.97 2.28  4.76 
MAL 6.57 8.46 8.06 8.27 6.65 7.19 7.71 3.01  6.99 
PL 2.32 2.18 4.84 5.36 6.33 5.67 5.76 7.67  5.02 
SLK      5.36 10.14 12.05  9.18 
SLV 8.06 6.10 5.49 6.71 6.03 8.09 6.29 6.04  6.60 
 
EU25 3.20 3.72 4.10 3.84 3.45 3.66 4.18 4.03  3.77 
EU15 2.51 2.48 3.03 2.66 2.62 2.76 3.80 3.60  2.93 
EA 2.59 2.56 3.14 2.77 2.74 2.97 4.23 4.02  3.13 
DK,SE,UK 2.18 2.14 2.58 2.19 2.15 1.90 2.08 1.92  2.14 
RAM10 4.36 5.80 5.88 5.81 4.85 5.02 4.75 4.67  5.14 
                              Note: AT= Austria, BE= Belgium, DE= Germany, ES= Spain, FI= Finland, FR= France, GR= Greece,  IE= Ireland,  
                                        IT= Italy, LU= Luxembourg, NL= Netherlands, PT= Portugal, DK= Denmark,  SE= Sweden, UK= United 
                                       Kingdom,CY= Cyprus, CZ= Czech Republic, EE= Estonia, HU= Hungary,LAT=Latvia, LIT=Lithuania,  
                                       MAL= Malta, PL= Poland, SK= Slovakia, SL=Slovenia. 
                                      * denotes figures equal to the un-weighted average of composite countries. 
        Capital buffer is defined as the institutions total risk weighted capital (Tier 2 + Tier 2) capital less the required 
minimum of 8%. Within each country we show average bank capital buffers weighted by bank market share. 
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                       Table 2: National Total (Tier 1 + Tier 2) Capital Requirements 
Countries Applying Ratio Above 8% 
 minimum  
required ratio 
year of 
 implementation 
reason 
UK 9%* 1979  
CY 8 % 1997  
 10 % 2001 Changes in market 
structure 
CZ 8 % 1992  
EE 10 % 1997 Rapid growth of bank 
assets and a change 
in operating  
environment 
HU 8 % 1991  
LAT 10 % 1997  
 8 % 2004  
LIT 10 % 1997  
 8 % 2005  
MAL 8 % 1994  
PL 8 % 1992  
SK 8 % 1997  
SL 8 % 2002  
                                                    Note:* As explained in Appendix I, the FSA sets additional 'trigger' and 'higher target' ratios for UK  
                                banks resulting in higher levels of capital required by the regulators. For this reason in the study we  
                                                              apply a 9% requirement to UK banks active in the sample and calculate the buffer as capital above  
this level. 
                                                             AT= Austria, BE= Belgium, DE= Germany, ES= Spain, FI= Finland, FR= France, GR= Greece, 
                                                             IE= Ireland, IT= Italy, LU= Luxembourg, NL= Netherlands, PT= Portugal, DK= Denmark,  
                                                            SE= Sweden, UK= United Kingdom, CY= Cyprus, CZ= Czech Republic, EE= Estonia, HU= Hungary,                       
                 LAT=Latvia, LIT=Lithuania,  MAL= Malta, PL= Poland, SK= Slovakia, SL=Slovenia. 
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 Table 3: Distribution of the Sample 
 commercial 
banks 
co-operative 
banks 
savings 
banks 
big banks 
(total assets> EUR37 
billion in 2004) 
small banks 
(total assets< EUR37 
billion in 2004) 
total 
 
AT 12 8 6 4 22 26 
BE 10  2 2 10 12 
ES 23 3 44 8 62 70 
FI 4  1 1 4 5 
FR 55 42 6 13 90 103 
DE 24 8 2 7 27 34 
GR 12   1 11 12 
IE 11   4 7 11 
IT 30 13 11 10 44 54 
LU 7   1 6 7 
NL 18 1  5 14 19 
PT 8 1 2 3 8 11 
 
DK 13  2 5 9 15 
SE 3 1 2 5 1 6 
UK 41  1 9 33 42 
 
CY 5    5 5 
CZ 3    3 3 
EE 2    2 2 
HU 6    6 6 
LAT 4    4 4 
LIT 2    2 2 
MAL 2    2 2 
PL 9  1 5 5 10 
SK 2   1 1 2 
SLOV 5    5 5 
 
EU25 311 77 80 85 383 468 
EU15 271 77 79 79 348 427 
EA 214 76 74 59 305 364 
DK,SE,UK 57 1 5 20 43 63 
RAM10 40 0 1 6 35 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Table 4: Description of Variables Adopted 
Variable Description 
Balance sheet variables 
 21 
buf  Total capital-national regulatory minimum as per table 2 
roe  return on equity 
risk  ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
2risk  loan-loss provisions over total assets 
size  log of total assets 
profit  post-tax profit over total assets 
loan∆  annual loan growth 
net loans  loans over total assets 
Business and economic cycle variables 
gdp  domestic and sub-sample GDP growth 
output gap  HP filtered real GDP series 
 
Figure 1: Capital Buffer Development by Sub-Sample 
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Figure 2: Capital Buffers by Bank Type and Size (Weighted by Total Assets) 
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real GDP growth savings commercial
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 Note: Capital buffer is defined as the institutions total capital less the required minimum.  
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Table 5: Two-Step GMM Estimates 
 EU25 EU15 EA 
 Model Specification 1 Model Specification 2 Model Specification 1 Model Specification 2 Model Specification 1 Model Specification 2 
Cycle variable: domestic 
cycle 
EU25 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU25 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EA cycle domestic 
cycle 
EA cycle 
 
1−tbuf  0.33 (4.22)*** 
0.41 
(4.62)*** 
0.28 
(3.66)*** 
0.24 
(5.82)*** 
0.18 
(2.91)*** 
0.18 
(3.02)*** 
0.33 
(3.51)*** 
0.25 
(3.24)*** 
0.14 
(3.12)*** 
0.21 
(3.62)*** 
0.19 
(4.62)*** 
0.21 
(3.76)*** 
roe  -0.03 
 (1.85)* 
-0.04 
 (1.66)* 
-0.03 
(1.81)** 
-0.03 
(1.31)* 
-0.04 
 (5.41)*** 
-0.05 
(3.43)*** 
-0.05 
(1.97)* 
-0.04 
(2.35)** 
-0.03 
(1.75)** 
-0.05  
(1.23)* 
-0.04 
(1.05) 
-0.05  
(1.16) 
risk  64.55 
(4.33)*** 
62.75 
(3.55)*** 
76.44 
(3.54)*** 
72.33 
(3.17)*** 
44.66 
(3.16)*** 
43.72 
(2.18)** 
35.86 
(5.02)*** 
66.97 
(4.87)*** 
42.11 
(3.12)*** 
37.62 
(2.42)** 
55.24 
(4.22)*** 
23.67 
(3.96)*** 
size  -3.97 
(6.33)*** 
-4.99 
(5.85)*** 
-3.62 
(0.66) 
-4.12  
(0.13) 
-3.25 
(2.88)*** 
-3.69 
(3.21)*** 
-0.97 
(0.64) 
-5.47  
(0.37) 
-4.46 
(4.00)*** 
-4.25 
(3.85)*** 
0.55 
(0.85) 
-0.21 
(0.64) 
profit    180.10 
(3.56)*** 
175.22 
(3.02)*** 
  165.21 
(3.99)*** 
135.21 
(3.42)*** 
  152.55 
(3.11)*** 
164.75 
(3.75)*** 
cycle  -0.10 
(3.77)*** 
-0.09 
(3.22)** 
-0.06 
(3.98)*** 
-0.02 
(3.01)*** 
-0.12 
(4.99)*** 
-0.12 
(4.65)*** 
-0.08 
(4.01)*** 
-0.41 
(3.33)*** 
-0.13 
(3.66)*** 
-0.15 
(5.02)*** 
-0.04 
(3.11)*** 
-0.10 
(2.98)*** 
loan∆    -0.01 
(3.06)*** 
-0.01 
(3.77)*** 
  -0.01 
(3.05)*** 
-0.00 
(2.52)** 
  -0.02 
(2.06)** 
-0.02 
(1.97)** 
net loans    -0.06 
(0.98) 
-0.06 
(0.76) 
  -0.11 
(1.02) 
-0.01 
(0.63) 
  -0.00 
(0.72) 
-0.01 
(0.99) 
 
Sargan 21.34 (0.74) 20.58 (0.67) 24.68 (0.88) 27.69 (0.76) 20.97 (0.69) 24.79 (0.78) 27.69 (0.99) 29.78 (0.92) 25.78 (0.76) 21.69 (0.59) 27.63(0.79) 22.46(0.83) 
)1(a  -2.16 (0.00) -2.78 (0.00) -2.34 (0.00) -2.65 (0.00) -2.02 (0.00) -2.76(0.00) -2.42 (0.00) -2.36 (0.00) -2.45 (0.00) -2.62 (0.00) -2.09 (0.00) -2.11 (0.00) 
)2(a  -1.56 (0.72) -1.69 (0.44) -1.11 (0.46) -0.84 (0.36) -1.04 (0.52) -1.33 (0.96) -1.42 (0.45) -1.29 (0.65) -1.65 (0.44) -0.95 (0.52) -1.08 (0.46) -1.12 (0.76) 
Note: Dependent variable is itBUF . Other variables as defined in Table 3. 
 T-values presented in parentheses. )1(a and )2(a represent first and second order residual tests. 
 *, **, ***  denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively. 
 Cycle variable corresponds to real GDP growth. Models including the broad and the sub-group cycle are estimated separately. 
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                                              Table 5 (continued): Two-Step GMM Estimates 
 DK,SE,UK RAM10 
 Model Specification 1 Model Specification 2 Model Specification 1 Model Specification 2 
Cycle variable: domestic 
cycle 
EU15    
cycle 
domestic 
cycle 
EU15    
cycle 
domestic 
cycle 
EU25    
cycle 
domestic 
cycle 
EU25    
cycle 
 
1−tbuf  -0.43 (3.02)*** 
-0.39 
(3.12)*** 
-0.39 
(4.01)*** 
-0.39 
(3.97)*** 
0.26 
(9.66)*** 
0.28 
(6.88)*** 
0.12 
(3.02)*** 
0.18 
(4.63)*** 
roe  -0.09 
(1.66)** 
-0.10 
 (0.98) 
-0.09  
(0.23) 
-0.08 
(3..2)*** 
-0.03 
(1.27)* 
-0.03 
(4.01)*** 
-0.03 
(0.45) 
-0.03 
 (0.66) 
risk  -31.69 
(4.02)*** 
-68.75 
(4.66)*** 
-30.06 
(2.99)*** 
-28.74 
(3.15)*** 
22.66 
(1.45)* 
26.78 
(1.75)** 
86.35 
 (3.05)*** 
77.84 
 (4.66)*** 
size  -3.24 
(4.52)*** 
-2.97 
(4.21)*** 
5.66 
(4.06)*** 
6.32 
(4.21)*** 
-10.54 
(4.66)*** 
-12.55 
(5.74)*** 
10.69 
(1.65)* 
11.87 
(2.46)** 
profit    
66.32 
 (4.02)*** 
78.56 
 (4.51)***   
82.47 
(4.66)*** 
90.57 
(4.06)*** 
cycle  -0.46 
(4.55)*** 
-0.40 
(6.33)*** 
-0.06 
(4.55)*** 
-0.38 
(5.78)*** 
0.10 
(2.02)** 
0.25 
 (3.97)*** 
0.19 
(2.55)** 
0.16 
(3.11)*** 
loan∆    
-0.02 
(3.13)*** 
-0.01 
 (4.12)***   
-0.06 
(3.11)*** 
-0.08 
(3.25)*** 
net loans    
0.01 
(2.99)*** 
0.00 
 (2.87)***   
-0.01  
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.55) 
 
sargan 32.58 (0.99) 29.87 (0.55) 26.89 (0.63) 27.96 (0.79) 25.67 (0.85) 21.46 (0.92) 22.97 (0.46) 23.69 (0.76) 
)1(a  -1.44 (0.00) -1.68 (0.00) -0.96 (0.00) -1.02 (0.00) -1.76 (0.00) -1.67 (0.00) -1.55 (0.00) -1.67 (0.00) 
)2(a  -1.62 (0.26) -1.79 (0.71) -1.24 (0.82) -1.34 (0.23) -1.21 (0.75) -0.99 (0.55) -0.92 (0.65) 0.76 (0.98) 
                                                        Note: Dependent variable is itBUF . Other variables as defined in Table 3. 
                                                        T-values presented in parentheses. )1(a and )2(a represent first and second order residual tests. 
                                             *, **, ***  denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively. 
                                                                Cycle variable corresponds to real GDP growth. Models including the broad and the sub-group cycle are estimated separately. 
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                         Table 6: EU15 Two-Step GMM Estimates by Type and Size of Bank 
 Commercial banks Co-operative banks Savings banks Big banks Small banks 
Cycle variable: domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle domestic 
cycle 
EU15 cycle 
 
1−tbuf  0.33 (4.00)*** 
0.21 
(4.11)*** 
-0.15 
(0.60) 
0.19 
(0.77) 
-0.17 
(1.46)* 
-0.16 
(3.04)*** 
0.44 
(6.00)*** 
0.30 
(4.66)*** 
0.25 
(3.33)*** 
0.15 
(3.21)*** 
roe  -0.03 
(1.52)* 
-0.04 
(1.33)* 
-0.01 
(0.70) 
-0.02 
(1.32)* 
-0.04 
(4.01)*** 
-0.06 
(4.66)*** 
-0.10 
(3.99)*** 
-0.7 
(3.12)*** 
-0.04 
(1.86)** 
-0.03 
(1.97)* 
risk  26.55 
(2.11)** 
22.46 
(2.12)** 
40.55 
(3.62)*** 
70.44 
(3.17)*** 
-31.22 
(4.11)*** 
-22.54 
(3.66)*** 
40.25 
(2.25)** 
69.68 
(2.52)*** 
29.66 
(2.23)** 
55.78 
(2.09)** 
size  0.56 
(0.77) 
0.33 
(0.17) 
-0.96 
(11.66)*** 
-7.22 
(4.62)*** 
-0.76 
(0.97) 
0.35 
(0.77) 
-0.10 
(5.44)*** 
-6.59 
(4.22)*** 
3.62 
(3.68)*** 
1.12 
(2.11)** 
profit  146.89 
(4.00)*** 
137.66 
(4.11)*** 
130.22 
(3.00)*** 
120.66 
(1.85)** 
170.22 
(4.06)*** 
140.66 
(4.98)*** 
201.46 
(3.88)*** 
160.35 
(2.93)*** 
130.22 
(2.99)*** 
88.66 
(4.01)*** 
cycle  -0.16 
(1.25)* 
-0.45 
(2.77)** 
0.15 
(2.18)** 
0.22 
(0.84) 
-0.10 
(3.00)*** 
-0.37 
(4.61)*** 
-0.12 
(2.53)** 
-0.55 
(1.63)* 
0.06 
(2.99)*** 
0.20 
(2.97)*** 
loan∆  -0.03 
(4.62)*** 
-0.02 
(3.85)*** 
0.00 
(3.66)*** 
0.03 
(4.96)*** 
0.01 
(0.75) 
-0.01 
(0.66) 
-0.01 
(6.33)*** 
-0.02 
(7.44)*** 
0.00 
(0.12) 
-0.00 
(0.32) 
net loans  0.10 
(1.05) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
-0.25 
(8.53)*** 
-0.03 
(4.00)*** 
-0.09 
(1.88)* 
-0.01 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(3.01)* 
0.01 
(3.00)*** 
-0.12 
(1.97)*** 
-0.01 
(1.86)* 
 
Sargan 42.44 (0.78) 34.66 (0.63) 27.89 (0.93) 25.67 (0.86) 22.97 (0.79) 33.79 (0.67) 31.75 (0.92) 22.97 (0.78) 23.67 (0.81) 22.75 (0.84) 
)1(a  -1.66 (0.00) -2.11 (0.00) -1.75 (0.00) -1.65 (0.00) -1.88 (0.00) 1.35 (0.00) -2.44 (0.00) -3.13 (0.00) -1.78 (0.00) -1.44 (0.00) 
)2(a  -1.21 (0.74) -1.34 (0.90) -1.66 (0.96) -1.53 (0.76) -1.57 (0.83) -1.45 (0.98) -1.76 (0.80) 1.45 (0.76) -1.55 (0.86) -1.63 (0.76) 
                           Note: Dependent variable is itBUF . Other variables as defined in Table 3. 
                            T-values presented in parentheses. )1(a and )2(a represent first and second order residual tests. 
                            *, **, ***  denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively. 
                                    Cycle variable corresponds to real GDP growth. Models including the broad and the sub-group cycle are estimated separately. 
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Appendix 1: Country-Specific Regulatory Measures 
EU15 
All of the countries in the EU15 sample have chosen to implement the BIS minimum of 
eight per cent as the requirement for internationally active banks. However, in addition 
to this, as discussed below, several countries have supplemented these rules with alterna-
tive measures to ensure soundness and stability. 
 
Spain 
In Spain, due to the concern of the Banco de Espaňa regarding the ability of Spanish 
banks to keep up with potential credit losses latent in the expansion of lending activity, 
capital requirement regulations were supplemented in June 2000 by a 'dynamic provi-
sioning' system. The idea of the provisioning was based on the notion that funds are set 
against loans outstanding in each accounting time period, in line with and estimate of 
expected long-run losses. Essentially, the idea is to build up a provision during good 
times which is subsequently drawn from during bad times. The provision will increase 
when actual losses for one year are lower than expected, and is used against specific pro-
visions in years when losses are higher than expected. The provisioning system therefore 
acts to smooth out cyclicality impacts of specific provisions on the profit and loss ac-
count.  
 The statistical provision is calculated using a bank's own internal method13, or alter-
natively, via a standard method recommended by the Banco de Espaňa. The standard 
method classifies exposures into six different categories, depending on their degree of 
riskiness, and each category is allocated a weight coefficient.14 The total provision is 
then equal to the sum of the requirements for all six categories. It is therefore unsurpris-
ing, as seen in Table 1, that the capital buffers of Spanish banks have remain relatively 
unchanged (around 3.6 per cent) since the implementation of the dynamic provisioning 
in June 2000.  
 
United Kingdom 
In addition to the basic requirements set out by the Basel Accord, the UK Financial Ser-
vices Authority (FSA) various additional requirements are implemented to assure the 
safety and soundness of the banking sector. First, sets two separate requirements for each 
                                               
13 The regulator must verify that the model adopted characterizes a suitable means to measure and manage 
credit risk. 
14 The coefficients range from 0 for zero risk exposures to 1.5 for high risk exposures. 
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bank: a 'trigger ratio' and a 'higher target ratio'. The 'trigger ratio' serves as a minimum 
ratio which will generate regulatory intervention if infringed. The 'target ratio' serves as a 
warning signal and as a cushion of capital acting to prevent the accidental breach of the 
'trigger ratio'. The gap between the 'target' and the 'trigger' ratio acts as a buffer in that 
regulatory pressure is exerted when the capital ratio falls below the 'target' but drastic 
regulatory action is only enforced in the event of a violation of the 'trigger ratio'. These 
ratios are bank specific and are based on the supervisor’s perception of the degree of 
riskiness of the banking institution. Banks deemed by the supervisor to be more (less) 
risky is required to hold higher (lower) levels of capital. Consequently, most UK banks 
are required to hold capital in excess of those specified by the EU directive. For the pur-
pose of our estimations, we calculate the capital buffer for UK banks based on an as-
sumed nine per cent minimum, since we are unable to obtain individual bank-specific 
requirement data.   
 
RAMS 
Banking policy for developing or transition economies generally tends to differ from that 
adopted for more developed markets. Since a stable financial system is vital for econom-
ic growth, the key questions for policy-makers in this context relate to the specific meth-
ods of bank regulation and supervision that can strengthen financial system regulation 
and supervision in order to promote more efficient and robust financial systems. Consid-
ering the largely varying degrees of development as well as the distinct differences that 
exist between the ram economies in terms of banking sector structures, it is unsurprising 
that the minimum capital adequacy ratio required of financial market operatives has var-
ied across countries throughout our sample period. 
 Table 1 highlights the minimum ratios adopted in each of the ram countries. In Esto-
nia and Cyprus, regulatory capital ratios have recently been tightened from eight to ten 
per cent of risk weighted assets to account for changes in market structure. In 1997, the 
Estonian authorities cited rapid growth of banks assets and changes in their operational 
environment as the main reasons for its higher regulatory ratio. In 2001, Cyprus raised its 
capital adequacy ratio to account for the increase in securities market activity. Latvia and 
Lithuania on the other hand both recently reduced their required ratios from ten to eight 
per cent effective from January 200515. 
 In Poland, while banks are required to hold no more than the eight per cent regulato-
ry minimum, 15 percent is the requisite ratio for banks in their first year of operation, 
and 12.5 percent in the second year. 
                                               
15 The ten percent regulatory minimum continues to be effective for AB VB Mortgage Bank in Lithuania. 
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Appendix 2: Checking for downward bias in the standard 
errors on aggregate variables 
We are concerned with a further econometric problem affecting all studies, such as our 
own, that combine macro-level and micro-data, whether in panel or cross-section. This 
problem, originally highlighted by Moulton (1990), is the downward bias on standard 
errors for macro-economic variables, when there is clustering of unobserved random var-
iables. This possibility cannot be ignored since any omission of macro-economic varia-
bles, affecting the dependent variable, will lead to such clustering. 
 
Correcting for clustering of unobserved variables can have a dramatic impact on reported 
significance levels. In the cross-sectional example reported by Moulton, standard errors 
on aggregate variables are biased upwards by a factor of around three. A change of this 
size would imply a fall for example in t-statistics from an apparently highly significant 
level of over 4, to a statistically insignificant level of less than 1.5. 
 
Several methods have been proposed to deal with this problem, the most common being 
'robust-cluster' adjustment of standard errors available in STATA. Unfortunately we have 
been unable to carry out this adjustment, since the adjustment is only available for the 
estimation of a static panel regression with random effects. The option to adjust our pre-
ferred dynamic fixed-effects regression models is not available. We instead conduct two 
alternative calculations in order to assess the magnitude of the resulting bias in the stand-
ard errors on our aggregate cyclical variables.16 First, we estimate a static random-effects 
version of our model, allowing us to then apply the 'robust-cluster adjustment’ to the 
standard errors. For purposes of comparison we compare these estimates with those from 
a static fixed-effects version of our model as well as our preferred dynamic fixed effects 
model. We find that for each variable, without the ‘robust cluster adjustment’, the stand-
ard error in the static regression using either fixed or random effects are very similar. We 
find that using the 'robust-cluster adjustment', the standard error changes increases by on 
average by around 20 percent for each variable within each sub-sample. This suggests 
that, while clustering of errors reduces but does not totally overturn the significance of 
our results. We therefore conclude that our sample is affected to only a small extent by 
the problem of residual clustering identified by Moulton (1990). 
 
 
                                               
16 Details of these alternative calculations are reported  in the working paper version of this article, JokiipI 
and Milne (2005). 
